Crushing Europe\u27s Pipeline Dreams: Russia\u27s Mineral Monopoly, Weakness in the European Energy Market, and Realism in the Future by Doty, Daniel
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 
Volume 37 (2012-2013) 
Issue 3 Article 5 
May 2013 
Crushing Europe's Pipeline Dreams: Russia's Mineral Monopoly, 
Weakness in the European Energy Market, and Realism in the 
Future 
Daniel Doty 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr 
 Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, and the International Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Daniel Doty, Crushing Europe's Pipeline Dreams: Russia's Mineral Monopoly, Weakness in the 
European Energy Market, and Realism in the Future, 37 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 759 
(2013), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol37/iss3/5 
Copyright c 2013 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship 
Repository. 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr 
CRUSHING EUROPE’S PIPELINE DREAMS:
RUSSIA’S MINERAL MONOPOLY, WEAKNESS
IN THE EUROPEAN ENERGY MARKET, AND
REALISM IN THE FUTURE
DANIEL DOTY*
INTRODUCTION
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the European
Union has been working to integrate its energy market.1 The goal of this
project was to allow the European Union to speak with a “common voice”2
in its dealings with supplier countries.3 Many of these countries were
located in the crumbling Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, which were
rapidly becoming more accessible to Western markets.4 At the same time,
the Russian Federation was recovering from the death of the USSR.
During and because of privatization in the 1990s, a handful of mega-
corporations came to dominate Russia’s oil and natural gas markets.5
During Vladimir Putin’s first eight years as President, the Russian gov-
ernment effectively nationalized many of these corporations.6 They sub-
sequently became important tools in Russia’s foreign policy repertoire,
expanding the Kremlin’s clout throughout Europe.7
This Note seeks to show that the pervasiveness of Russia’s influence
in the politics and energy market of the European Union demonstrates
* Editor-in-Chief, William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review. J.D. Candidate,
William & Mary Law School, 2013, B.A., Major in International Affairs, The George
Washington University, 2009. The author would like to thank his family for their support
and encouragement during law school, and Drs. James Goldgeier and Leon Aron for their
kind assistance in developing my understanding of the topic.
1 Andrei Konoplyanik & Thomas Walde, Energy Charter Treaty and Its Role in
International Energy, 24 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 523, 524 (2006).
2 Pekka Voutilainen, Developing Energy Policy for Europe: A Finnish Perspective on
Energy Cooperation in the European Union, 29 ENERGY L.J. 121, 131 (2008).
3 Id.
4 See id.
5 MARSHALL GOLDMAN, PETROSTATE 59–62 (2008).
6 Id. at 93–135 (describing in some detail the renationalization of multiple companies
under Putin). Putin first served as President of Russia from 2000 to 2008, then served
as Prime Minister from 2008 to 2012, when he was reelected to the Presidency for a third
term after amendments to the Russian Constitution permitted him to do so.
7 Id.
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serious systemic weaknesses in the organization and administration of
the European Union’s energy policy. As one researcher put it, “Russia is
close to Europe; it possesses huge oil and gas reserves; and it is a natural
energy supplier for the European Union.”8 Because Russia is Europe’s
largest, most aggressive, and closest supplier, its interactions with the
European Union form the ideal case study for examining these weak-
nesses. This Note posits that the biggest flaw with both the current and
proposed energy policies is that each is essentially nothing more than a
free trade agreement, rather than a common market agreement transfer-
ring substantial sovereignty in energy trading to the European Union.
Finally, the Note calls for a drastic change in the existing strategy to
include more stringent central control and expansion of the policy’s foci.
The Note will first provide a brief overview of the Union’s policy
as it stands now. This section will begin with a discussion of the objec-
tives and terms of the Energy Charter Treaty (“ECT”), and address the
proposed Common Energy Policy (“CEP”) designed to supplement and in
some ways replace the Energy Charter Treaty in use now. The section will
also include a summary of a major argument in favor of the CEP’s utility.9
The Note will then describe the Russian state energy monopoly;
this section will be divided into two subparts focused on the monopoly’s
post–Cold War history and on its organization. Following this section will
be a series of examples of Russia’s involvement around the European
Union to show some of the existing policy’s vulnerabilities. The final sec-
tion will be devoted to the future. Three subparts will be focused, respec-
tively, on a more detailed discussion of the broader flaws of the existing
policy; the creation of a more successful, permanent plan for the future;
and a pair of potential obstacles that exist in the present and must be
considered and overcome to implement the Note’s proposed solutions.
I. THE POLICY AND THE PROPONENTS:
OPTIMISM FOR AN INTEGRATED MARKET
A. State of the Law—The Energy Charter Treaty
As mentioned previously, the European Union has been working
to develop a coherent energy policy since at least 1990.10 In that year,
8 Christophe-Alexandre Paillard, Russia and Europe’s Mutual Energy Dependence, 63
COLUM. J. INT’L AFF. 65, 65 (2010).
9 See generally Voutilainen, supra note 2. Voutilainen’s position is a prototypical example
of the optimism and enthusiasm that surround most attempts at energy market inte-
gration. Id. A secondary purpose of this Note is to caution against the complacency that
often accompanies this type of excitement.
10 Konoplyanik & Walde, supra note 1, at 524.
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Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers proposed a European Energy Com-
munity in an attempt to coordinate Western European trade with the
suddenly and chaotically liberated markets in Eastern Europe.11 The
strategy embodied in this proposal sought to reconcile Western Europe’s
interests in maintaining energy security with Eastern Europe’s interests
in exporting its mineral resources.12
This proposal ultimately led to the European Energy Charter on
December 17, 1991.13 The Charter subsequently gave way to the ECT,
which was signed exactly three years later on December 17, 1994, and en-
tered into force on April 16, 1998, after the thirtieth member ratification.14
Currently, fifty-one countries in Europe and Asia, and the European Union,
are parties to the ECT; Russia was an observing party until October 18,
2009, at which point it effectively withdrew itself from the agreement.15
The ECT focuses on five broad areas:
[P]rotection and promotion of foreign energy investments
. . . ; free trade in energy materials, products and energy-
related equipment . . . ; freedom of energy transit through
pipelines and grids; reducing the negative environmental
impact of the energy cycle through improving energy effi-
ciency; and mechanisms for the resolution of State-to-
State or Investor-to-State disputes.16
The Treaty, with these focus areas, is the European Union’s primary
document governing energy trade with external suppliers.17 Note that it
11 See id.
12 Id. It is interesting to note that the original intent of the agreement was to increase
interdependence between the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries and Western
Europe in an effort to protect energy supplies. The irony of this strategy’s results should
remain in mind when the reader considers Europe’s reluctance to change course today.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 524–25.
15 Energy Charter: Frequently Asked Questions, ENERGY CHARTER (Oct. 12, 2011), http://
www.encharter.org/index.php?id=18.
16 ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY AND RELATED DOCUMENTS:
A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL ENERGY COOPERATION 13 (Sept. 2004) [herein-
after ENERGY CHARTER TREATY], available at http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user
_upload/document/EN.pdf.
17 The European Union has developed a number of initiatives designed primarily to inte-
grate the domestic common market for electricity and fund renewable energy innovation
and development. See Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and re-
pealing Directive 2003/54/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 211) 55–93; see also Directive 2001/77/EC of
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is jointly signed with signatories outside the European Union18 and ac-
cordingly is not a mechanism custom-designed for use by the European
Union’s internal governing bodies.
The sources and inspiration for the content in the Energy Charter
Treaty come from three major sources: bilateral investment treaties
(“BITs”); the incorporation of EU directives on liberalization in areas like
upstream resource licensing, resource procurement, transit, free access
by third parties to transit infrastructure, and the like; and the principles
of the World Trade Organization’s General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (“GATT”).19
According to Konoplyanik and Walde, respectively, the former
Deputy Secretary-General of the Energy Charter Secretariat and the
former UN Interregional Advisor on Petroleum and Mineral Legislation,
the “ECT needs to be seen today as one of the best available instruments
for improving international energy security.”20 The reason for this, they
suggest, is that the development of an interdependent energy infra-
structure—one which ties together suppliers, consumers, and transit
countries—ensures energy security because any short- or long-term
disruptions to energy trade would not be in the best interests of any of
the involved parties.21
To summarize the purpose of the ECT, the Treaty is focused pri-
marily on removing barriers to international energy investments and on
“promot[ing] fair access to markets.”22 The Treaty aims to create an
international energy trade regime modeled primarily on NAFTA and on
the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the promotion of
electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market,
2001 O.J. (L 283), [hereinafter Directive 2001/77/EC]; What Is the SET-Plan?, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, http://setis.ec.europa.eu/about-setis/what-is-the-set-plan (last visited Mar. 24,
2013) [hereinafter What Is the SET-Plan?]. See generally EUROPEAN WIND ENERGY
ASSOCIATION, EU ENERGY POLICY TO 2050: ACHIEVING 80–95% EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS
(Mar. 2011) [hereinafter EU ENERGY POLICY TO 2050], available at http://www.ewea.org
/fileadmin/ewea_documents/documents/publications/reports/EWEA_EU_Energy_Policy
_to_2050.pdf.
18 Id. at 17. Some non-European Union signatories include Australia, Japan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Mongolia, while observers include countries from all continents—China,
Canada, Iran, the United States, Venezuela, and Nigeria are just some of the observing
parties. Id.
19 Konoplyanik & Walde, supra note 1, at 528. For more discussion on the international
legal impact of GATT, see DUKE UNIVERSITY, RESEARCH GUIDE: GATT/WTO (2011), avail-
able at http://www.law.duke.edu/lib/researchguides/pdf/gatt.pdf.
20 Konoplyanik & Walde, supra note 1, at 529.
21 See id.
22 Id. at 531.
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BITs developed by the United States and the United Kingdom.23 To put
it another way, the Treaty is a free trade agreement, without being de-
fined explicitly as such.
B. Developing Law—The Common Energy Policy
In 2007, Europe recognized the need for an integrated consump-
tion plan and began drafting CEP, which would apply only to the European
Union.24 This section discusses some of the main points of the CEP and
how it differs from the existing ECT. When reading this section, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that the CEP as it stands right now is nothing
more than a proposal.25 There exists in Europe no binding policy for the
whole of the European Union.26
A 2008 paper authored by a prominent Finnish diplomat expressed
optimism about the 2007 draft of the CEP, and about the future of the
policy in Europe.27 The author of this paper, like many at the time, be-
lieved that the 2007 plan was a significant step toward the integration
of the energy market.28 More importantly, he saw it as a move toward the
day when the European Union speaks with one voice to meet “the chal-
lenges of oil and gas geopolitics.”29 The paper goes so far as to suggest
that the draft puts the “development of a common energy policy back at
the heart of EU action,” which he likens to a return to the principles
behind Euratom and the European Coal and Steel Community.30
According to Voutilainen, energy security is an important focus
of the integrated market.31 In his eyes, the 2007 policy placed an em-
phasis on the importance of solidarity between member states and the
diversification of supplier countries and transportation routes.32 He
23 Id. at 532.
24 An Energy Policy for Europe, Communication from the Commission to the European
Council and the European Parliament on Oct. 1, 2007, available at http://ec.europa.eu
/energy/energy_policy/doc/01_energy_policy_for_europe_en.pdf.
25 Jacques Delors, Energy Policy Needs ‘More Europe,’ NEW EUROPE ONLINE (Jan. 30,
2012), http://www.neurope.eu/article/energy-policy-needs-more-europe-exclusive. Jacques
Delors “is a French economist and politician, [and was] the eighth president of the
European Commission.” Id.
26 Id.
27 See generally Voutilainen, supra note 2.
28 Id. at 131.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 123.
31 Id. at 125.
32 Id.
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specifically mentions Russia, stating that the dialogue between the
European Union and Russia is central to the issue of supply security33
and cites the sheer volume of the energy trade between the two.34 Tell-
ingly though, while Voutilainen’s analysis mentions the importance of en-
ergy security, the four strategic goals that the EU Council itself outlined
for the Energy Policy did not include any mention of supply security.35
The drafters instead focused on issues of energy efficiency and the per-
formance of the domestic energy market.36
Indeed, the policy discussion surrounding energy security in
Voutilainen’s paper is surprisingly sparse. The author suggests that
“dialogue with [other] consuming countries is becoming more important
to external energy relations,”37 and that “[the] EU will . . . strive to
develop energy partnerships with these countries that are transparent,
predictable, and reciprocal.”38 The most specific language he uses in the
discussion surrounds transit countries, mentioning the development of a
Memorandum of Understanding on energy with Ukraine and the imple-
mentation of an “early warning mechanism” with Belarus.39
The most starkly telling statement concerns an anecdote about a
group of heads of state discussing energy issues with President Putin at
an EU summit meeting “using one collaborative voice.”40 The story con-
jures an image of a group of contrite children finally gathering the cour-
age to ask an adult for a favor. Voutilainen goes on to say he is “mildly
optimistic that the EU [can] find enough common ground to develop joint
approaches” to energy security.41
The tenor of this article suggests that the primary reason for
optimism about the development of a common energy policy is the CEP’s
plan for the domestic market. The language regarding dealings with
external suppliers is tepid at best. However, this approach to energy
suppliers—“wait until we have handled the domestic issues before we
33 Voutilainen, supra note 2, at 130.
34 Id. at 135. The data Voutilainen cites in his article—import and export figures from
2004—demonstrates the feebleness of the European Union’s efforts to diversify suppliers.
Imports from Russia of gas and oil are listed at twenty-four percent and twenty-seven
percent, respectively; a virtual margin-of-error difference from their present (higher)
levels. Id. at 134; see also Paillard, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
35 Voutilainen, supra note 2, at 128.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 134.
38 Id. at 135.
39 Id. at 136.
40 Id. at 137–38.
41 Voutilainen, supra note 2, at 138.
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address foreign trade policy”—is a dangerous path to take.42 Dominant
suppliers like Russia are capable of taking advantage of chinks in the
Union’s armor in a way that ultimately disturbs the efficiency of the
Union’s domestic markets as well.43
II. THE SUPPLIER: RUSSIA’S ENERGY MONOPOLY
A. Post–Cold War
While Europe was attempting to develop a common energy market,
the Russian Federation was experiencing the aftershocks of the cataclys-
mic fall of Communism.44 The same epochal event that gave Europe incred-
ible opportunities to expand trade with the former Warsaw Pact45 gave
way to a frenzy of barely regulated privatization in Russia.46 Voucher pri-
vatization and the loans-for-shares program that replaced it were a one-two
punch to the middle and lower classes, and the accompanying chaos lasted
through much of the 1990s.47 The upshot of these programs was that a
handful of men came to control most of Russia’s wealth; these oligarchs
owned virtually all the telecommunications companies, manufacturing
plants, and most importantly, the instruments of oil and natural gas ex-
traction and production.48
The rapid privatization and consolidation of wealth did not last
long, however. After being appointed President in 1999 by his predecessor,
Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin was elected in his own right in 2000.49 Putin’s
inauguration marked a new era in Russia. More quickly than they had been
privatized under the oligarchs, Russia’s largest oil and natural gas monop-
olies were effectively nationalized.50 Companies like Gazprom, Yukos, TNK,
42 See id.
43 See infra Part III.
44 THE WORLD BANK, FROM DISINTEGRATION TO REINTEGRATION: EASTERN EUROPE AND THE
FORMER SOVIET UNION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 2 (Harry G. Broadman ed., 2006), avail-
able at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECA/Resources/tradereport-complete.pdf.
45 See generally id. (analyzing the trade relations of twenty-seven former Soviet countries,
finding generally that they are more integrated in the world economy now than “at any
time since the Russian Revolution”).
46 GOLDMAN, supra note 5, at 63–65 (background on loans for shares); JEFFREY SACHS,
THE END OF POVERTY 143–44 (2005) (detailing the impact on the Russian people).
47 SACHS, supra note 46, at 143–44.
48 GOLDMAN, supra note 5, at 97–103.
49 Presidents of Russia—Biographies, KREMLIN (Jan. 31, 2012), http://archive.kremlin.ru
/eng/articles/presidents_eng.shtml.
50 GOLDMAN, supra note 5, at 104–105.
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and Rosneft all came under the control of the Kremlin after the oligarchs
who owned them were exiled, incarcerated, or otherwise neutralized.51
B. Current Structure of the Energy Monopoly
The five largest energy companies in Russia are Gazprom,52
LUKoil,53 Rosneft,54 TNK-BP,55 and Surgutneftegas.56 Of these, two—
Gazprom57 and Rosneft58—are directly owned and controlled by the state.
LUKoil, while privately owned, is heavily influenced by state policy; most
if not all energy deals, major acquisitions, and major sales followed ex-
tensive consultation with Vladimir Putin.59 Putin was even in attendance
during the opening of LUKoil’s first gas station in New York City.60
Surgutneftegas is similarly privately owned but state-influenced; its
owner, Victor Bogdanov, is a former government energy manager61 who
only rarely deviates from the State’s energy policies.62
Of the top five energy companies, only TNK-BP can claim private
control, but not for lack of contest. The company is owned half by BP and
half by a Russian company called AAR.63 In 2008 the Russian govern-
ment kicked Robert Dudley, then the CEO of TNK-BP, out of the country
for two years.64 Just recently a Russian court threw out a complaint by
51 Id. at 105, 114–16.
52 Global 500: 35. Gazprom, FORTUNE MAG. (July 25, 2011), available at http://money.cnn
.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2011/snapshots/10542.html.
53 Global 500: 69. LUKoil, FORTUNE MAG. (July 25, 2011), available at http://money.cnn
.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2011/snapshots/10657.html.
54 Global 500: 179. Rosneft Oil, FORTUNE MAG. (July 25, 2011), available at http://money
.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2011/snapshots/11314.html.
55 Global 500: 235. TNK-BP International, FORTUNE MAG. (July 25, 2011), available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2011/snapshots/11572.html.
56 Global 500: 496. Surgutneftegas, FORTUNE MAG. (July 25, 2011) available at http://
money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2011/snapshots/11311.html; see Fortune
Global 500, FORTUNE MAG. (July 25, 2011), available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines
/fortune/global500/2011/full_list/index.html (listing no other Russian energy companies
apart from those mentioned in the preceding footnotes).
57 Gazprom in Questions and Answers, GAZPROM, http://eng.gazpromquestions.ru/index
.php?id=10 (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
58 Rosneft at a Glance, ROSNEFT, http://www.rosneft.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
59 GOLDMAN, supra note 5, at 126.
60 Id. at 125.
61 Id. at 61.
62 Id. at 124.
63 Id. at 126–27.
64 Louise Armitstead, TNK-BP’s Chief Accuses Russians of Power Abuse, THE TELEGRAPH
(Aug. 23, 2008), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/2795202/TNK
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AAR, the Russian half of TNK-BP, against BP for an alleged violation of
an exclusivity agreement.65
Russia’s mineral resource industry is both massive and extremely
important to the European Union’s energy markets. For purposes of illus-
tration, Rosneft is ranked 179th on Fortune’s Global 500 list.66 More im-
pressively, Gazprom is now the thirty-fifth largest company in the world,
with annual revenues of over $118 billion and, according to company lit-
erature, possesses the world’s largest gas reserves.67 Additionally, the
European Union currently imports over half of its oil and gas.68 Russia
is the primary supplier of both, currently supplying close to one-third of
the European Union’s supply of each resource.69
The sheer size of the industry inherently carries with it substan-
tial weight to throw around in the policy arena if the government that
controls it is so inclined. It seems quite evident that the Russian govern-
ment has demonstrated the intent to do so. In 1997 Vladimir Putin de-
fended a thesis at the St. Petersburg Mining Institute.70 In this thesis,
-BPs-chief-accuses-Russians-of-power-abuse.html. Robert Dudley was the head of TNK-BP,
and was subjected to an extensive harassment campaign by the government; inspections
were scheduled on short notice when he was going to be gone, including an inspection of
Dudley’s visa paperwork. Id. He was expelled from the country and banned from return-
ing for two years, thus ending his administration of the company; he was removed by the
government and not by the corporation itself. See id.
65 Vladimir Soldatkin & Melissa Akin, BP Wins Russian Court Cases Over TNK-BP,
REUTERS (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/11/us-tnkbp-court
-idUSTRE7AA1K720111111. This looks as if the Russian government was tolerating BP’s
violations of its contract at the expense of Russian business, as a Russian court dismissed
the Russian company’s claim against BP. However, it is important to note that the deal
against which AAR filed suit was a strategic partnership between BP and state-owned
Rosneft. Presumably, a violation of the exclusivity agreement would not have been tol-
erated if one beneficiary had not been an instrument of the state.
66 Rosneft, FORTUNE MAG., supra note 54.
67 Gazprom, FORTUNE MAG., supra note 52; Gazprom Today, GAZPROM, http://www.gazprom
.com/about/today/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
68 Paillard, supra note 8, at 70.
69 Id.
70 Harvey Balzer, Vladimir Putin’s Academic Writings and Russian Natural Resource
Policy, PROBLEMS OF POST-COMMUNISM 48 (2006) (a translation with minimal commentary
of an article written by Vladimir Putin summarizing the dissertation; the thesis itself is
not publicly available). This Note’s focus on the philosophy of Vladimir Putin stems from
the commonly held assumption that Putin’s behavior during his first two terms, the amend-
ments to constitutional term limits passed during his time as Prime Minister, and his
return for a third term as President indicate that Putin will lead Russia for much of the
foreseeable future. Additionally, it is the opinion of a number of scholars, and the author
of this Note, that Putin’s beliefs are structurally intertwined with Russia’s policy de-
velopment, an outgrowth of Russia’s super-presidential and increasingly centralized
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Putin advocated for the use of Russia’s natural resources and natural re-
source companies to execute foreign policy strategies both related and
unrelated to the country’s energy or financial goals.71
According to Putin, the Russian economy would continue to center
on natural resources for much of the twenty-first century.72 He noted that
the natural resource industry is a source for much of the country’s budget,
the “basis for the country’s military might,” and a source of social stability.73
He went on to say that privatization created problems for the industry;
the state “let strategic management of the natural resource complex slip
from its hands,” which “resulted in stagnation of the national natural re-
source potential . . . and a series of other negative consequences.”74
Putin did not see minimal regulation as the appropriate level of
involvement for the state.75 He intended for the long-term relationship be-
tween the state and its natural resources to be long, complex, and close.76
Ultimately, he sought to create an industry of “national champions,” com-
panies that “would put promotion of the state’s interest over profit maxi-
mization.”77 As discussed below, much of what these “national champions”
were employed to do involves exploiting systemic vulnerabilities in the
European Union’s government and markets to advance Russia’s foreign
policy interests.78
III. THE BUYERS: CRACKING THE FOUNDATION OF INTEGRATION
Russia’s actions over the last decade, and particularly in the last
six years, have exposed serious vulnerabilities in the European Union’s
policies of energy market integration. Since the introduction of the new
draft energy policy in 2007, Russia has cut off natural gas supplies to
transit countries—non-Union countries through which supply pipelines
run to connect European buyers to gas fields in Russia—multiple times.79
government. For more discussion on this topic—which could fill volumes on its own—see
PETER BAKER & SUSAN GLASSER, KREMLIN RISING (2005).
71 GOLDMAN, supra note 5, at 97–99.
72 Id. at 50.
73 Id. at 51. Social stability is one of the most intriguing factors here; Putin does not ex-
plore this at length but notes that the raw materials industry is the sole reason for the
existence of a number of cities.
74 Id. at 52.
75 Id. at 53–54.
76 Id.
77 GOLDMAN, supra note 5, at 99.
78 See discussion infra Part III.
79 See infra Part III.A.
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In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia.80 This came in the midst of increased
Georgian cooperation with Europe and two years after Georgia, in coop-
eration with Azerbaijan and Turkey, opened a major non-Russian oil
pipeline to Europe.81 Russia has even shut off direct supplies to Union
members and been implicated in influence peddling in Germany and
Italy, without consequence.82
A. Shut-Offs
Russia has shut-off gas supplies to non-Union transit countries
multiple times over the past six years; these regular shut-offs are highly
disruptive not only to the transit countries but to the European Union
itself.83 Pricing disputes between Russia and Belarus have resulted in gas
shut-offs to this country alone more than once.84 Because Belarus is not the
terminus of the pipelines Russia threatens to disconnect, downstream
countries—and EU members—like Poland, Lithuania, and Germany be-
come secondary victims in many of these disputes.85
Ukraine is a more disturbing and consistent victim of these shut-
downs. Russia effectively blackmailed the country in 2005 following the
Orange Revolution, which ousted Leonid Kuchma, then the pro-Kremlin
president of Ukraine.86 On January 1, 2006, Russia cut gas supplies to
the country after Ukraine refused to sign an agreement that would have
more than quadrupled the price of natural gas, the primary source of
heat for most Ukrainians.87 The shut-off lasted for four days.88 Russia did
80 Michael Schwirtz et al., Russia and Georgia Clash over Separatist Region, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 8, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/09/world/europe/09georgia.html
?pagewanted=all.
81 See Robert O. Freedman, The Russian Invasion of Georgia—Its Impact on Israel and
the Middle East, 2 CAUCASIAN REV. OF INT’L AFF. 179, 180 (2008).
82 See infra Part III.C.
83 Andrew E. Kramer, Russia Threatens Cut in Belarus Gas Supply, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/02/world/europe/02russia.html.
84 Belarus Blocks Russian Oil Deliveries to Germany, Poland and Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 8, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/08/business/worldbusiness/08iht-web.0108oil
.4135709.html (relating the news that Russia increased oil duties, doubled gas prices, and
banned sugar imports from Belarus; Belarus responded by shutting down a major Russian
export pipeline that runs from Russia to Kaliningrad, Russia’s exclave on the Baltic).
85 Kramer, supra note 83.
86 GOLDMAN, supra note 5, at 144–45.
87 Russia Cuts Ukraine Gas Supplies, BBC NEWS (Jan. 1, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2
/hi/europe/4572712.stm.
88 Miriam Elder, New Year’s Tradition: Behind the Russia-Ukraine Gas Conflict, DER
SPEIGEL (Jan. 5, 2009), http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,599571,00.html.
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the same thing in 2009; while running anti-Ukrainian political ads in
Russia, Gazprom sought to alleviate some of its debt problems by hiking
prices in its gas contracts with Ukraine.89
Shut-offs that target Ukraine are particularly disruptive to the
European Union.90 Gas routed through Ukraine flows to the TransGas
Pipeline, which leads to Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Austria, Germany,
and Italy.91 A full eighty percent of the natural gas that the European
Union imports from Russia flows through Ukraine,92 which amounts to
about one-quarter of the Union’s total supply.93
Russia has also shut down direct supply lines to European Union
member states.94 In 2006, Russia closed the taps on the northern branch
of the Druzhba pipeline after Lithuania privatized a major refinery by
selling it to a Polish company.95 This action pre-empted a Russian com-
petitor that was attempting to purchase the refinery from Lithuania.96
Many observers believed that the decision to close Druzhba was a puni-
tive action against both Lithuania and Poland.97 Ultimately, the Druzhba
pipeline was reopened after heavily one-sided negotiations.98 There were
no consequences to Moscow for its mineral muscle flexing; the absence
of any coherent European Union energy security strategy, or “united
voice,” was belied by the incoherence of the member states’ positions
after the matter was concluded.99
89 Id.
90 Paillard, supra note 8, at 68.
91 See id.
92 Elder, supra note 88.
93 See Paillard, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
94 See Vladimir Socor, Russian Oil Pipeline Shutoff to Lithuania: Wider Ramifications,
EURASIA DAILY MONITOR, June 6, 2007, available at http://www.jamestown.org/single
/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=32789.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 See, e.g., id. Some oil from the Druzhba pipeline ultimately makes its way on to Poland.
As Socor notes in his article, “Lithuanian and Polish refineries [could] still receive Russian
crude oil from Primorsk [a port near St. Petersburg]” but “the transport by tanker adds
to the price of crude, cuts into refineries’ income and profit margins, affects their share
values, and reduces their tax contributions to state budgets.” Id.
98 See The Baltic Pipeline System: The Key Federal Project in the Leningrad Region,
LENINGRAD REGION, http://eng.lenobl.ru/economics/investment/principlefederalprojects
/balticoilpipeline (last visited Mar. 24, 2013) (demonstrating that the Baltic Pipeline
System II—a new branch of Druzhba fed by the main line—is a going concern, showing
that Druzhba is still operating).
99 Cf. Peter Spiegel, Putin Set to Resume Battle with Barroso, FINANCIAL TIMES
(Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/34042dd6-3f7f-11e0-a1ba-00144feabdc0
.html#axzz1nu4m4PtE. The article explains some history of the frustrations of EU
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B. Invasion
In early August 2008, Russian forces moved into the Georgian
region of South Ossetia under the guise of protecting an ethnic Russian
minority in that area.100 Georgia resisted the invasion, launching a coun-
terattack on the Ossetian town of Tskhinvali.101 The counterattack was
stopped, and the Russian military responded by driving far into Georgia,
cutting off the primary east-west road in the country and stopping their
invasion just short of the capital city of Tbilisi.102 A cease-fire was bro-
kered five days after the conflict broke out.103
The conflict had a number of root causes, but control over oil and
gas distributions seems to have been a strong motivating factor for
Russia. Tensions briefly erupted in 2003 because Russia felt Georgia’s
developing connections with the West—including Georgia’s interest in
NATO membership—were viewed as a violation of what Russia considered
to be a privileged zone in her “near abroad,” a term used to describe former
USSR and Warsaw Pact members that border the Russian Federation.104
The invasion in 2008 came less than three years after the conclusion of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline (“BTC Pipeline”), one of the only major pipe-
lines from Central Asia to Europe not controlled by a Russian company.105
Some infrastructure supporting the Georgian section of the BTC Pipeline
came under attack during the war, and just two days before Russia in-
vaded the pipeline was bombed by a Kurdish terrorist organization in
Turkey.106 Additionally, the war itself prompted concerns in Azerbaijan
and other parts of central Asia about the wisdom of involvement in any
oil transit pipeline that bypassed Russia completely.107 It seems highly
President Jose Manuel Barroso in dealing with Putin’s Kremlin, and illustrates the failure
of any stern words to have any impact on Russia’s actions. Id.
100 LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, RUSSIAN FEDERATION: LEGAL ASPECTS OF WAR IN GEORGIA,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, 9–11 (2008), available at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/russian-georgia
-war.pdf.
101 INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT FINDING MISSION ON THE CONFLICT IN GEORGIA
REPORT 10 (2009), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/30_09_09_iiffmgc
_report.pdf.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 11.
104 Id. at 14.
105 See Freedman, supra note 81, at 180.
106 Nihat Ali Ozcan, Energy Security and the PKK Threat to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
Pipeline, 6 TERRORISM MONITOR 18 (2008), available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs
/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=5170&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=167&no
_cache=1.
107 Id.
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probable that the war was motivated not by concern for “disadvantaged
Russian minorities,” which exist in many countries neighboring Russia,
but by disdain for the bypass project and for continued European involve-
ment in Russia’s “near abroad.”108
C. Influence Peddling
While Russia—and indeed any energy supplier—has a great deal
of political influence with the governments of consumer countries, per-
haps nowhere has the extent of the Kremlin’s reach been so starkly
illustrated as in Berlin. When he was inaugurated Chancellor in 1998,
Gerhard Schroeder promised to phase nuclear power out of Germany’s
energy portfolio.109 At this point, nuclear power provided about one-third
of Germany’s electricity.110 During his time in office, Schroeder advocated
strongly for a pipeline agreement with a company called Nord Stream
AG, a Russian-operated natural gas pipeline designed to replace nuclear
energy as a primary energy source and to guarantee the security of
Germany’s energy supply.111 Immediately after leaving office in 2005,
Schroeder was named Chairman of Nord Stream, a position he still
occupies.112 While the European Union has launched multiple ethics
investigations against Mr. Schroeder, no additional proceedings have
been pursued.113
108 JIM NICHOL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34618, RUSSIA-GEORGIA CONFLICT IN AUGUST
2008: CONTEXT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS 12–13, 21 (2008), available at http://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34618.pdf; see also Svetlana Skarbo & Jonathan Petre, The
Pipeline War: Russian Bear Goes for West’s Jugular, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 10, 2008), http://
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1043185/The-Pipeline-War-Russian-bear-goes-Wests
-jugular.html; Jad Mouawad, Conflict in Georgia Narrows Oil Options for West, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/14/world/europe/14iht-14oil.15268305
.html?pagewanted=all.
109 Germany to Phase Out Nuclear Energy—Schroeder, BBC NEWS (Nov. 10, 1998, 8:53 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/211911.stm.
110 NUCLEAR SAFETY IN GERMANY: REPORT UNDER THE CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY
BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY FOR THE FIRST REVIEW
MEETING IN APRIL 1999, 7 (1999), available at http://www.bfs.de/www/kerntechnik/CNS
_99_E.pdf.
111 See Editorial, Gerhard Schroeder’s Sellout, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2005, at A26, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/12/AR2005121201060
.html.
112 Our Management, NORD STREAM AG (2011), http://www.nord-stream.com/our-company
/management.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
113 Tobias Buck & Bertrand Benoit, EU to Probe German Gas Pipeline Guarantee, FINANCIAL
TIMES (May 8, 2006), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4b16eef6-deb2-11da-acee-0000779e2340
.html#axzz1afWdCm3v.
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D. The Consequences
The clear implication is that the “united front” of Europe’s energy
trade with outside suppliers is in fact riddled with massive gaps. These
gaps are easily and effectively entered and exploited by outside suppliers
like Russia. The ultimate consequence is not just that Europe is unable
to “speak with one voice” in the international energy market; the Union
has virtually lost control of its internal and external energy trade. In
some cases examined above, the Union and its members have even found
domestic policy to be under the sway of supplier countries.
The consequences are not just political. Russia’s ability to exert
such serious political pressure on the European Union also limits the
Union’s ability to control Europe’s physical environment. For example,
the Nord Stream pipeline runs through the Baltic Sea, one of the world’s
most polluted oceans.114 The bottom of the Baltic Sea was littered with
barrels of mercury, World War II–era naval mines, “the entire chemical
arsenal of Nazi Germany,” and surplus chemical weapons from a number
of other participants in the war.115 Despite the fact that many of the lit-
toral nations were EU members, the European Union itself had little to
do with the environmental discussion about the future of the pipeline.116
The main deal was signed between Germany and Russia and subsequent
demands for environmental impact assessments came not from the Euro-
pean Union itself but from individual nations like Lithuania, Estonia,
and Finland.117 The Union’s silence and the division of opinion between
Germany and the other Baltic nations is a clear implication that the di-
versity of interests in the Union—some of which was driven by supplier
countries like Russia—has hindered progress toward centralized control
of the European energy market by the European Union. While no cata-
strophic mercury leaks have yet occurred in the Baltics to provide critics
114 Charles Hawley, Europe’s Underwater Chemical Dump: Tons of Mercury Found in the
Baltic Sea, DER SPEIGEL, Aug. 30, 2006, available at http://www.spiegel.de/international
/0,1518,434329,00.html.
115 Id.
116 See Vladimir Socor, Baltic Seabed Gas Pipeline Project: Far from a Done Deal, EURASIA
DAILY MONITOR, May 22, 2007, available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache
=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bany
_of_the_words%5D=nordstream&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=32757&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid
%5D=7&cHash=31a0fbf0ebd3f7239cdd1b569437c39b.
117 See id.; Finland Tells Nord Stream to Study Alternative Routes, REUTERS (Jan. 21,
2008), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/01/21/environment-finland-nordstream-dc-idUK
L2150308920080121.
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an “I told you so” moment, the fact remains that the European Union has
little weight with which it can push back against supplier countries in
cases like that of the new Nord Stream pipeline.
Such a position is quite clearly both precarious and unsustain-
able, especially for a Union whose very foundation rests on principles of
supranational sovereignty and the strength of a multinational economy.
Circumstances demand that the Union take quick action to seal the gaps
and strengthen the integrated market.
IV. THE FUTURE: CREATING A STRONG, PERMANENT
PLAN FOR THE COMING YEARS
As discussed previously, the energy market in Europe is currently
governed by the terms of the Energy Charter Treaty.118 We have already
seen the vulnerabilities in Europe’s energy security situation. This sec-
tion aims primarily to address some of the flaws in the ECT that Russia’s
actions expose, and then explain the best way to remedy these defects.
A. Flaws
One of the primary flaws in the treaty is in the philosophy under-
lying its structure. Konoplyanik and Walde suggest that the development
of a free energy market encourages interdependence, which in turn pro-
tects energy security because interdependent countries will try to avoid
the disruptions that are the inevitable result of trade disputes.119 The
authors—and the drafters of the ECT—fail to recognize that interdepen-
dence is only even potentially functional between similarly situated parties,
and even then may not prevent disruptions.120 Russia so far outbalances
any individual EU member that the consequences to Russia of a service
disruption are minimal, even if the consequences to the member state are
significant.121 To put it another way, that the European Union members
are all part of one Treaty does not mean each speaks with one voice.
Given that this treaty has been signed by countries all over the world,
118 See supra Part I.A.
119 See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text; see also NORMAN ANGELL, THE GREAT
ILLUSION (1909). Published just before WWI, Angell argued that wars between European
powers were futile and obsolete because of the integration and liberalization of the
European economy.
120 See ANGELL, supra note 119.
121 See supra Part III.A.
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the security interests of Poland and France are no more mutually rein-
forced by this treaty than are the interests of Japan and Moldova.
Another problem with the Treaty is the way it treats signatory
states and its ability to compel actions by different states. There is no
distinction between supplier countries and consumer countries.122 Fur-
thermore, the fact that the Treaty focuses so intently on liberalization
means that it does not carry with it enforcement mechanisms; there are
no incentives for good behavior or punishments for bad actions.123 The
Treaty does not seek to intervene in energy security beyond expressing
common principles on the topic.124 It does not “provide any particular
effect method to compel countries which are not interested in developing
[good governance through rule of law] nor does it, or can it, compel
energy flows between reluctant suppliers or consumers.”125 In short, if
interdependence does not stop Russia’s intransigence—and, as we have
seen, it certainly has not—there is no enforcement mechanism in the
Treaty with which to seek an alternative remedy because the ECT exists
to liberalize the energy trade, not to guarantee its safety, supply security,
or price consistency.
B. Fixes
There are a number of potential fixes to the weaknesses in Europe’s
current energy strategy—or lack thereof. The most important thing for any
new plan, however, is to centralize the formation of policy and the negoti-
ation of all European energy deals under the purview of the European
government. Additional possibilities include new ethics rules, and an ex-
pansion of currently existing plans to develop alternative energy sources,
which would decrease dependence on external suppliers. This section de-
tails an itemized list of important policy suggestions.
Create an office or agency that handles the creation of energy policy
for the entire European Union. Europe’s countries recognized the difficul-
ties of disunited monetary policy and attempted to solve them by sacrificing
control to the central government and the European Central Bank.126 They
can certainly do the same with energy policy if it is indeed more beneficial
122 See generally ENERGY CHARTER TREATY, supra note 16.
123 See Konoplyanik & Walde, supra note 1, at 531.
124 See generally ENERGY CHARTER TREATY, supra note 16.
125 Konoplyanik & Walde, supra note 1, at 532.
126 Nathan Lewis, What Is the Purpose of the Euro?, FORBES (May 13, 2011), available at
http://www.forbes.com/2011/05/12/euro-currency-purpose.html.
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to act as one voice. European leaders and thinkers certainly believe it is,127
and the events of the past few years firmly support that conclusion.128
Bar EU member states from making independent deals with out-
side suppliers. This would be a relatively simple solution to one of the
primary issues with the current regime: Russia’s ability to divide the
European Union along lines of differing member state interests and
establish Russia’s desired policy with relative ease. Again, while individ-
ual states would be barred from acting independently to make deals with
external supplier countries, the Union-level agency described above
would be tasked with making uniform policies for the entire community.
The new policy can be enacted by the European Union under the
doctrine of supremacy, which states that Union member states must set
aside domestic law—even executive prerogatives granted under the consti-
tution of the member state—when it conflicts with a treaty or law of the
European Union.129 This policy would work hand-in-hand with the cen-
tralized agency proposal listed above—no country would be authorized
to circumvent the policies lawfully entered by the central government.
Both policies are necessary. The first allows the European Union
to actually speak with one voice in the field of energy, and to know that
any policy enacted will carry with it the full weight of the Union economy,
an effective counterbalance on Russian muscle flexing. The second pre-
vents Russia from pursuing divide-and-conquer strategies by ensuring
that any agreements procured with a member state by doing an end run
around the central energy agency would be invalidated.
Recognizing that many EU members chafe at sacrificing any sov-
ereign authority to the Union,130 a more politically palatable option could
conceivably be a pairing of a central energy agency with a purely advi-
sory function with a European Commission veto over deals entered into
by individual member nations. That way, member nations preserve their
ability and right to freely enter agreements with external supply nations
and to tend to their own interests, and the Union retains the power to
127 See generally Voutilainen, supra note 2; Delors, supra note 25.
128 See supra Part II.
129 See, e.g., Declaration Concerning Primacy, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on
the European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Communities, Dec. 13,
2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 256; case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 19640 E.C.R. 585 (1964);
Solange II (Re Wuensche Handelsgesellschaft, Bundesverfassungsgericht [Federal Con-
stitutional Court] [BverfGE] Oct. 22, 1986, 3 CMLR 225, 265) (Ger.).
130 See, e.g., EU Constitution: Where Member States Stand, BBC NEWS (Mar. 25, 2007,
1:21 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3954327.stm (demonstrating the wide diver-
sity of opinion on the EU Constitution, a measure intended to further centralize authority
in the European central government).
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void any agreements that violate the principles of policy that the central
energy administration formulates.
Establish new ethics rules for former member state officials.
Obviously the most notable case calling for such a rule is that of Gerhard
Schroeder. There was no meaningful obstacle at either the European
Union level or the German level to prevent him from joining the board
of directors of a company that had a major influence on his administra-
tion. Legislation should be enacted by the EU government that bars
former member state executives and cabinet ministers from representing
or working for parties that were involved in matters that were of sub-
stantial importance during the administration of those officials.
The United States, in working to eliminate the “revolving door”
between Congress and private lobbying firms, provides a decent legisla-
tive model. Two relevant provisions from American conflict of interest
law provide for:
(1) a lifetime ban on “switching sides,” that is, representing
a private party on the same “particular matter” involving
identified parties on which the former executive branch
employee had worked personally and substantially for the
government; (2) a two-year ban on “switching sides” on a
somewhat broader range of matters which were under the
employee’s official responsibility.131
Such rules would be greatly beneficial to the European Union; the life-
time ban would have prevented Schroeder from ever working for Nord
Stream after he left office and thus may have shielded Germany from
outside influence in domestic energy policy-making.
Expand funding for existing alternative energy research and in-
novation programs. As mentioned above, the Union has established a
number of programs and legislative directives to develop new sources of
alternative energy in the European Union.132 These programs are de-
signed both to foster energy independence—which helps to guarantee the
security of Europe’s energy supply—and to reduce Europe’s emissions
pursuant to the Union’s 2020 Energy and Climate Change goals.133
131 JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-875, POST-EMPLOYMENT, “REVOLVING
DOOR,” LAWS FOR FEDERAL PERSONNEL at Summary (2010), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs
/misc/97-875.pdf; see also 18 U.S.C. § 207 (2012).
132 Supra note 17.
133 Europe 2020 Targets, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Jan. 20, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu
/europe2020/europe-2020-in-a-nutshell/targets/index_en.htm. The Union’s climate and
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Legislative action by the European central government has
proved an effective tool in developing renewable energy throughout the
European Union. In 2001, the Union implemented a “directive on elec-
tricity product[ion] from renewable energy sources.”134 The purpose of the
act is simply to encourage the development of renewable electricity gen-
eration and “create a basis for a future Community framework thereof.”135
The Directive requires the Commission—not an independent agency—to
establish national goals for each EU member state.136 The overall goal set
by the directive was an increase in market share for renewables to 21%
of energy consumption across the entire Union.137 By 2009, the Union
had already increased the share of renewables to 19.9%, demonstrating
the success the Union has had with implementing change through leg-
islative action.138 This type of central government goal-setting could also
be extremely helpful when solving the problem of foreign involvement in
member countries’ domestic policy formation.
Research encouragement policies have been somewhat less suc-
cessful, despite their utility in demonstrating the ambitions of the Union
as a whole. The Strategic Energy Technologies (“SET”) plan is one of the
Union’s leading innovation programs in the area of alternative energy;
the Union refers to it as “the technology pillar of the European Union’s
energy and climate policy.”139 The plan has four goals:
• Accelerating knowledge development, technology
transfer and up-take;
• Maintaining EU industrial leadership on low-carbon
energy technologies;
• Fostering science for transforming energy tech-
nologies to achieve the 2020 Energy and Climate
Change goals;
• Contributing to the worldwide transition to a low
carbon economy by 2050.140
energy targets by 2020 are to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by twenty to thirty per-
cent, increase the market share of renewable energy sources to twenty percent, and in-
crease the Union’s “energy efficiency” by twenty percent. Id.
134 Directive 2001/77/EC, supra note 17, at 33.
135 Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
136 Id.
137 EU ENERGY POLICY TO 2050, supra note 17, at 15.
138 Id.
139 What Is the SET-Plan?, supra note 17.
140 Id.
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The plan also has a projected budget of nearly 71.5 billion Euro.141 While
the goals of the plan are clearly very lofty and are in keeping—whether
intentionally or not—with the pursuit of energy security, a recent task
force report by the Centre for European Policy Studies suggests that the
program has gone little farther than demonstrating its ambitions.142 In
particular, the report notes that “an efficient and truly competitive
integrated EU energy market, the necessary grid infrastructure and
accompanying cross-border regulation . . . will provide market pull for
low-carbon technologies.”143 The report states optimistically that the Plan
“has the potential to accelerate the rate of innovation” with EU support.144
It also suggests however that the Plan has not yet done so and will not be
able to without more active leadership by the European Commission.145
V. POTENTIAL OBSTACLES
There are two major obstacles that exist to the implementation of
the above proposals, and this Note will address each individually. First,
Russia will rightly be uncomfortable with the development of alternative
and renewable energy sources. Second, and most importantly, the Euro-
pean Union is currently immersed in an acute and potentially existential
economic and financial crisis.
Russia’s fear of alternative and renewable energy. Any increase in
the market share for renewables and domestic energy will necessarily
diminish Russia’s piece of the pie; it seems unlikely that Russia will be
pleased with the weakening of one of its main foreign policy levers.146
Additionally, it may be difficult for Russia to believe that Europe’s diver-
sification of supply is not an expression of Europe’s fears or worries about
the Russian Federation.
The perception that the European Union still fears Russia could
cast a negative pall over relations with the Federation. Reaching out to
Russia to develop a cooperative renewables investment strategy could be
a useful way around this. Russia has ratified the Kyoto Protocol and has
141 Id.
142 See generally THE SET-PLAN: FROM CONCEPT TO SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION,
CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES (Lars Erik Liljelund et al., eds. 2011), available
at http://www.ceps.eu/ceps/dld/5531/pdf.
143 Id. at 2.
144 Id. at 3.
145 Id.
146 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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actually exceeded its greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals.147 While
the reasons for this success may be debated, Russia has clearly demon-
strated at least some minimal level of commitment to environmental
protection and may be a willing participant in a cooperative alternative
energy program, particularly if some financial benefit could be recognized
that would offset any losses from its diminished fossil fuel market share.
The European Union is in crisis. This is by far the most significant
obstacle to the creation of any coherent common energy policy in the
European Union. The International Monetary Fund refused to fund any
additional bailout measures for sovereign debt relief in the Eurozone,
and the head of that organization stated that the Eurozone crisis is cur-
rently “the biggest source of global instability.”148 A number of observers
have speculated that the sovereign debt crisis may ultimately result in
the demise of the Euro as a viable currency.149 Additionally, unemploy-
ment in the Eurozone stands at a record high of twelve percent as of
December 2012, including 26.2% unemployment in Spain.150 With such
existential economic threats on the horizon, it seems clear that Europe
will likely see issues like this one as back-burner topics. However, the
“end of the Eurozone” is at this point nothing more than a hypothesis.
Indeed, it may be helpful to focus energies on the development of
renewables; such a project could rejuvenate the European economy.
CONCLUSION
Russia’s energy industry is a coherently organized behemoth
working hand-in-hand with the Russian state. As mentioned earlier,
Russia’s energy companies are among the largest companies of any sort
in the entire world. Four of the five largest of these regularly cooperate
147 UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008—
FIGHTING CLIMATE CHANGE: HUMAN SOLIDARITY IN A DIVIDED WORLD 22, available at http://
hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-8/papers/Perelet_Renat_Pegov_Yulkin.pdf.
148 George Osborne: No More IMF Money for Eurozone, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 26, 2012, 6:36
AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/feb/26/george-osborne-no-imf-eurozone.
149 Tony Barber & Daniel Dombey, Businesses Plan for Possible End of Euro, FINANCIAL
TIMES (Nov. 29, 2011, 9:32 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/25ab975a-1a9f-11e1-ae14
-00144feabdc0.html#axzz213qSPa2C; Is This Really the End?, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 26,
2011, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21540255.
150 Josephine Moulds, Eurozone Won’t Begin Recovery Until Late 2013, Mario Draghi
Says, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/nov/30
/eurozone-unemployment-record-high.
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with the Kremlin, and the last has in the past been the target of a state-
managed harassment campaign.151 Vladimir Putin has written on the
importance of the mineral natural resource companies to the national
economy and indeed to the national culture; his “national champions”
philosophy considers the industry to be an important point of leverage in
international and domestic relations.
Europe’s energy market is clearly divided in its dealings with
supplier countries, despite past attempts at integration in the market.
There was a stark divide in the Continent’s response to the Nord Stream
pipeline; a number of Baltic countries were against it even as Germany
agreed to it. The response of Union members to the invasion of Georgia
was even more varied, ranging from conciliatory to averse to silent. The
unity of the Russian energy industry in its policy decision-making has
driven a wedge between Union members that have become used to mak-
ing unilateral policy decisions. The success of this divide-and-conquer
strategy has become a significant obstacle to the integration of the
European market.
Russia’s interactions with Europe and countries of geopolitical
interest to Europe demonstrate the serious shortcomings of the current
policy, or lack thereof. As we have seen, Gerhard Schroeder was allowed
to gut the German nuclear energy industry without consequence. The
Union stood by and allowed member states to force the issue on environ-
mental assessments in the Baltic states. No action was taken against
Russia for gas shut-offs to transit countries; indeed, the Voutilainen article
discussed above suggests that the only thing to do about these shut-offs
is to assemble a gas reserve and an “early warning system” to mitigate
the effects of such incidents, rather than prevent them from happening.
Europe has gone so far as to announce the existence of a problem, but
there is a gaping void in policy that desperately needs to be filled.
There is, however, hope for the future of the European Union’s
energy policy in the pursuit of a handful of goals. These goals are meant
to be suggestive, not necessarily prescriptive. The primary goal of the
proposals included in this Note is to highlight the need for an integrated
and mutually accountable mineral purchase apparatus.
The Union must, as has been previously suggested, increase soli-
darity between member countries. The European Union can achieve this
by increasing the accountability of each member to the others and to the
government of the European Union as a whole. This type of accountability
151 See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
782 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 37:759
would require individual states to surrender more sovereignty to the
supranational government.
To avoid another Schroeder situation, any new policy also re-
quires provisions governing internal markets, including but certainly not
limited to new ethics rules for former governing officials. The European
Union should also establish a government body to deal with external sup-
pliers, or expand the role of an existing body like the European Council
to include these duties. One of the clearest failures of the European
Union is its inability to speak with a “united voice.” Centralizing that re-
sponsibility would do much to create that voice.
The Union could develop a common fund for the development of
alternative energy sources; the resulting pool of capital would be greater
than any member state could achieve on its own and the diminished
reliance on foreign suppliers would help insure against interference from
outside. Finally, an alternative; a common scheme of environmental
regulations and a body to enforce them—an “EU EPA”—that could super-
sede independent treaties that run contrary to Union interests under the
doctrine of primacy, or it could guide energy trade agreements by the
European Union or the member states.
Clearly, this Note would be exceedingly starry-eyed if it failed to
acknowledge the existence of major impediments to success, most of
which should be fairly familiar to European observers. The status quo in
Europe has for years been the sovereign right of member nations to
negotiate and conclude their own energy agreements. The mere fact that
the European Union has even come so far in terms of the transfer of
sovereignty is almost a miracle; the concerns surrounding this issue
make every extra step toward centralization a chore for the Union.
The crisis in the Eurozone is a far more serious obstacle. At least
one Union member faces default, and a number of observers have sug-
gested the possibility that the Euro’s days as a uniform currency for the
Continent are limited. Without the Euro, the future of the European
Union is at stake. Facing such an existential threat, it seems unlikely
that the European Union will address more tactical issues like this one
in the immediate future.
Ultimately, these limitations should not matter. The European
Union needs to do something. Supplier countries speak with one voice;
OPEC has central price-setting mechanisms, and even privately held
energy companies in Russia make decisions in tandem with state-owned
companies and the government. Because of that, these suppliers have the
upper hand in negotiations with Europe. The costs of inaction to the
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Union as a whole—in terms of environmental control, continental security,
energy pricing, and even the mere harm to the credibility of the European
Union as a governing body, for example—far outweigh the costs of action
to any individual member nation. Additionally, allowing external energy
suppliers to divide the Union along policy lines at a time when European
unity itself is at stake is negligent at best. Accordingly, the government
of the European Union should further centralize power in the energy
arena and negotiate more robustly with suppliers in the stead of individual
member governments.
